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Theme: The West must find new ways to cooperate with Russia now that Vladimir Putin 
and Dmitry Medvedev have used its energy revenues to transform the country into a 
resurgent power and developed an assertive policy towards the West. 
 
 
Summary: The Russian Federation has come back to the international arena as a 
resurgent superpower thanks to its oil and gas revenues and the leadership of Vladimir 
Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. An assertive Russian superpower has adopted a tough anti-
Western stance in its external security policy against both NATO’s expansion towards the 
East and against the deployment of the US missile shield programme in Europe. The 
Kremlim has used energy as an instrument of power in the Ukraine and has employed 
military power in Georgia, and new documents, such as the 2003 Defence White Paper, 
the 2007 Overview of Foreign Policy, the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept and the 2009 
National Security Strategy express a consistent line of thought in Putin and Medvedev’s 
foreign and security policy. 
 
This ARI reviews the developments in Russia’s foreign security policy,1 the continuity in 
the ideas and action of both Russian leaders, the challenges and opportunities of 
Russian-Western cooperation in Afghanistan and the energy security and military-
operational issues that can be addressed through a bottom-up approach. 
 
 
 
 
Analysis:  
Under Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, Russia has developed from a neglected 
regional power into a self-declared resurgent superpower. The basis for Moscow’s forceful 
come-back to the international arena has been the inflow of enormous oil and gas 
revenues as a result of swiftly rising world prices. Russia’s past as the Soviet superpower 
and its close ties with the upcoming new powers of China and India have served as a 
springboard for regaining an influential status in the world. Simultaneously, Moscow has 
developed an assertive policy towards both the West and its wary neighbours, culminating 
in armed conflict with Georgia. How can the West best respond to such an assertive 
Russian superpower? 
 
Under President Vladimir Putin the Kremlin adopted an anti-Western stance, exemplified 
by its condemnation of NATO’s expansion and policies –including the deployment of a 
missile shield– and its suspension of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. 
His successor President Dmitry Medvedev has continued Russia’s tough stance on 
                                                 
* Senior Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael. 
1 This article is partly derived from the author’s Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, 
Medvedev and Beyond, Routledge, March 2010 (see 
http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415477307/). 
Area: Security annd Defence 
ARI 97/2010  
Date: 16/6/2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 2
security but adopting some personal initiatives of his own. For instance, as to policy 
structure, Medvedev has proposed a new European security architecture, aiming to 
remove the remaining vestiges of the Cold War, although this is also a natural feature of 
Russia’s traditional policy of rejecting Western security organisations. Next, he launched 
(or updated) major security documents and released a dedicated strategy for the Arctic 
region. Furthermore, in support of his assertive external security policy, he announced 
large-scale military modernisation plans, absent during Putin’s reign. In implementing this 
policy, Medvedev proved the continuity of the country’s firm foreign policy stance by using 
military force in an armed conflict with Georgia and by engaging in a further round in 
Russia’s gas conflict with the Ukraine (as Putin had done in 2005-06). 
 
Likeminded Security Thinking and Policy Actions 
Although security documents are highly declamatory and often propagandistic, the 
following comparative approach demonstrates that they are of value in assessing 
Moscow’s security policy of today and tomorrow. Concerning the structure of foreign 
security policy, Putin’s security documents of 2000-08 revealed a number of 
characteristics that would return in the foreign and security policy documents and 
statements of his successor, Dmitry Medvedev. 
 
A first recurring element was that the 2003 Defence White Paper (DWP) already stressed 
the importance of establishing well-trained and equipped largely professional armed 
forces with a high level of combat readiness, capable of conducting high-tech warfare 
worldwide. These entries were repeated in Putin’s Strategy 2020 speech of 2008 and 
were to be the foundation of the military reforms announced by Medvedev in the aftermath 
of the Georgian conflict, while also being laid down in his National Security Strategy 
(NSS) of May 2009. A second continuing aspect was the enumeration of the possible 
threats from the West, from NATO and the US in particular. A third characteristic, only 
mentioned in Putin’s 2007 Overview of Foreign Policy (OFP), which was also dominant in 
Medvedev’s security thinking, was the events in Kosovo and the separatist regions of 
Georgia, which in 2008 –because of Kosovo’s independence and the Georgian conflict– 
brought about a serious deterioration in the relationship between Russia and the West. 
Fourth, Putin’s second-term documents as well as Medvedev’s 2008 Foreign Policy 
Concept (FPC) and his 2009 NSS all stressed that Russia was now acting from a position 
of strength which enabled it not only to play an important role in the international arena, 
but also to influence its agenda. A fifth continuing feature, found in every security 
document and statement of Putin and Medvedev, was the protection of Russians citizens 
elsewhere, brought into practice in the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008. A sixth 
recurring theme, mentioned in Putin’s second-term security papers and in Medvedev’s 
documents, was energy (resources and security) as an essential element of Russia’s 
international stance and as the ground for conflict caused by actors short of these 
resources. Gas conflicts with Ukraine and others, under Putin (2005-06) and Medvedev 
(2008-09) would prove the continuity of the importance of this ‘energy weapon’ as a major 
policy instrument for Moscow. 
 
With regard to the implementation of policy, Medvedev’s action also usually concurs with 
Putin’s. In addition to the examples above, the Kremlin’s prolonged vigorous stance has 
manifested itself in demonstrations of military force against Moscow’s ‘foes’, for instance 
by threatening the European states involved in the US missile-shield programme, by 
conducting strategic nuclear bomber and naval exercises, by re-instating the traditional 
military parade on Red Square and by starting or resuming military cooperation with its 
traditional friends –countries ‘hostile’ to the West– such as Libya, Syria, Cuba and 
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Venezuela. Even when Russia became severely affected by the international financial 
crisis, at the end of 2008, the Kremlin only temporarily changed its assertive attitude 
towards the West into a more moderate one. Hence, Moscow’s security documents from 
2000 to 2008 have followed a consistent line in thought and practice under both Putin and 
Medvedev. 
 
Energy as an Essential Instrument of Power 
Along with the rise in oil and gas prices, President Putin gradually realised the importance 
of energy (resources and security) as an economic, political and military tool. To exploit it 
he began by implementing economic, human resources, military, policy-thinking and 
policy-execution measures. First, the state’s role in the energy sector had to be 
consolidated. This he achieved by taking back assets from private owners, such as Yukos 
in 2003, and by limiting the role of foreign owners of Russian means of energy production. 
By 2007 the Kremlin controlled around 30% and 87% respectively of Russia’s oil and 
natural gas production. In addition to gaining control of the ownership of these energy 
assets, Putin also demanded to have personal control over the energy sector, by 
appointing state officials in key positions in vital enterprises. Additionally, he appointed 
Gazprom’s Chairman Dmitry Medvedev his successor for the Presidency and Sergei 
Ivanov, the Minister of Defence, as First Deputy Prime Minister. Hence, this closely 
aligned Gazprom and the armed forces, that is, energy and the military as instruments of 
power. Further evidence of the ‘alliance’ of these two state instruments was that the army 
has been given the task of ensuring the country’s energy security. Energy (resources and 
security) for the first time became an integral part of policy thinking in Russia’s security 
papers, including the Overview of Foreign Policy (2007) and the Strategy 2020 (2008). 
Finally, Putin put energy as a power instrument into practice by cutting energy deliveries, 
for different reasons, to the Ukraine (2005-06, because of the Orange Revolution and its 
Western aspirations), Georgia (2006, Rose Revolution and Western aspirations), Estonia 
(2007, war memorial removal) and the Czech Republic (2008, US missile-shield 
agreement). Furthermore, he started new pipeline projects –Blue, Nord and South 
Stream– to divert the Ukrainian transit route and to discourage the Western alternatives 
such as BTC, BTE and Nabucco. 
 
Medvedev has basically continued with Putin’s policy of energy as a tool of power policy. 
On the theoretical side, Medvedev –who is stronger than his predecessor– has addressed 
energy issues in his security documents, successively in the 2008 FPC, the 2008 Arctic 
Strategy and the 2009 NSS. The NSS openly says that Moscow considers energy 
resources a tool for exerting its leverage on other states. On the policy implementation 
side, Medvedev fought out a gas dispute with the Ukraine in January 2009, as Putin had 
done in 2005-06. Furthermore, he has continued Putin’s policy of building alternative gas 
pipelines to northern and southern Europe in order to make the troubled transit route 
through the Ukraine to Europe superfluous and to counter Western attempts to divert 
supplies from Russian pipelines by creating alternative transit routes. This has also been 
achieved by negotiating contractually-binding energy resources from Central Asian states. 
The August 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict was probably also part of this pro-active 
Russian policy, since the energy transit routes from Azerbaijan via Georgia to Europe 
were in a conflict area that would reduce their attractiveness to Western energy 
companies. Consequently, the use of energy resources as a strong-armed policy as 
introduced in Putin’s second term, has even been reinforced under Medvedev as a vital 
element of Russian foreign security policy. 
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The West and Russia: How to Move On? 
Although the current relationship between Russia and the West should not be regarded as 
a new Cold War, it is evident that interaction between the two parties is constrained by a 
number of obstacles that need to be removed. Options for an improved relationship 
between the West and Russia can especially be found in the fields of energy security, 
Afghanistan and cooperation at the political-strategic and military-operational levels. 
 
Energy Security 
At first sight, the topic of energy security reveals an exclusively hostile attitude of both 
players towards each other, as a result of Russia’s energy dominance and the West’s 
energy dependence from Russia. The West is seeking energy diversity in the aftermath of 
Russia’s recurring use of it as an energy weapon, by means of cutting off the supply to 
pro-Western states in what it considers to be its sphere of influence –Georgia and the 
Ukraine– which also affect energy deliveries to NATO/EU states. The West is trying to 
ensure diversity and a lower dependence on Russia by creating alternative pipelines to 
tap Central Asian energy sources via Azerbaijan and Georgia. However, Russia is 
reluctant to accept the fact that energy producers in the former Soviet area, such as 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, are entitled to follow their own interests in trading their 
energy resources with NATO/EU member states. Moreover, Moscow wants to eliminate 
its transit dependence on the Ukrainian pipeline network and is trying to get western and 
southern European states interested in constructing alternatives, the so-called Nord 
Stream, South Stream and Blue Stream pipelines. For NATO, energy security –due to the 
increasing global demand and the danger of crises from decreasing supply levels– will 
steadily become more important on its agenda. Energy security is likely to be a crucial 
element of future NATO-Russia relations, either positively or negatively, or even both at 
the same time. The role of the military in energy security –whether for national armed 
forces or for the combined forces of alliances such as NATO and the Russian-led 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)– is increasing at a rapid pace. The main 
actors, Russia and the US, have to decide whether their energy security policy will be one 
of confrontation or of partnership. By reducing its energy dependence on Russia, by 
obtaining oil and gas elsewhere and by replacing hydrocarbons by alternative durable 
energy resources, NATO and the EU can also decrease the tensions with Russia in this 
domain, because Russian opposition will then become less effective. Furthermore, 
international terrorism and piracy –as off the coast of Somalia– is a threat not only to 
Western but also to Russian energy infrastructures. These international developments 
offer possibilities for joint action in energy security for both actors, and can also have a 
positive effect on their relationship. 
 
Afghanistan 
Concerning Afghanistan, NATO and Russia –and its allies in the CSTO and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO)– face the same threats: Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorism 
and drug trafficking. Russia, as the leading member state of the CSTO and, together with 
China, at the forefront in the SCO, could promote a joint effort by these two Eastern 
security organisations to support NATO and the EU in Afghanistan. First, this could be 
achieved by a military contribution, by dispatching troops to the NATO-led ISAF 
contingent, which would strengthen the efforts in the war against the Taliban. However, 
actual military cooperation between NATO and CSTO/SCO still seems far off due to 
political sensitivities. Alternatively, other options for political and socio-economic 
cooperation between CSTO/SCO and NATO –for instance, in reconstruction projects in 
Afghanistan and in the fight against drugs, and with the EU in police and/or humanitarian 
aid cooperation– are also plausible. The SCO states have claimed their primacy in Central 
Area: Security annd Defence 
ARI 97/2010  
Date: 16/6/2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 5
Asian regional security, but so far the organisation has taken no action in countering the 
threats from Afghanistan. By cooperating in and around Afghanistan, the West and Russia 
–the latter in its prominent role in the CSTO and SCO– could reduce mutual suspicion and 
distrust and improve stability and security generally in Central Asia. An example of East-
West cooperation on Afghanistan has been the granting by Russia and other CSTO/SCO 
member states of transit rights to NATO to ship goods and equipment for the ISAF 
operation in Afghanistan through their territory. Furthermore, Russia did not withdraw this 
permission during the deterioration of relations with NATO resulting from the Georgia 
conflict. This is a good example of structural and mutually beneficial cooperation on 
Afghanistan which could be followed by other initiatives. 
 
Political-Strategic and Military-Operational Cooperation 
Both parties can make efforts to improve their relations on the political-strategic level. 
From its side Russia should remove the anti-Western entries from its security documents 
and refrain from making anti-NATO/US statements. On the other side, unless there is a 
military necessity to continue with it, NATO should withdraw its air protection (Quick 
Reaction Alert) force over the Baltic States, after training and equipping these allies to 
perform the task themselves. Furthermore, the US and NATO should abstain from 
deploying substantial forces near Russia. However, such political-strategic changes are 
difficult to carry out and if they are implemented, they will take considerable time. In the 
meantime military-operational cooperation suggests itself as an option for improved 
relations that can be easier to achieve and is –from the example of arms control 
inspections– a proved confidence-building measure. Therefore, it would be helpful if 
Russia were to end its suspension of the CFE Treaty in order for mutual inspections to be 
restored, fostering confidence and trust on both sides. Increased military cooperation 
might in due course also encourage progress and the strengthening of political-strategic 
ties. With regard to military-operational opportunities, both parties share good 
experiences, such as Russia’s contribution to NATO’s peacekeeping operations in Bosnia 
(SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR) and in NATO’s Article 5 maritime operation Active 
Endeavour to fight international terrorism, and joint theatre missile-defence exercises. 
These examples of military-operational cooperation could be expanded with other joint 
operations, including cooperation between NATO (ISAF) and the Russian-led CSTO in 
Afghanistan against the narcotics trade, joint peacekeeping exercises, information 
exchanges between commanders and military-academic lecturers of operational 
experiences –for instance in irregular warfare and operational doctrine– and as 
exchanges of (cadet) officers in training modules and of military academic staff in lecture 
postings. In political talks, as well as in exchanges between military academies, a topic 
could be the statements in Russian security documents on threats from the West. To 
discuss these in public could clear the atmosphere. Such cooperation in the political-
strategic and military-operational dimensions promotes international stability and reduces 
in mutual suspicion and distrust. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Recommendations for an Improved Relationship 
A primary prerequisite for improved relations is that Russia and the West should seriously 
consider each other’s sensitivities. Furthermore, Russia should realise that US policy is 
not necessarily the same as NATO’s or the EU’s. Conversely, the West should accept the 
fact that Russia is ‘back in business’ in the international arena, whether it likes it or not. 
Also, the US, the EU and NATO should carefully consider their actions in the East to 
avoid unnecessary conflicts with Russia, as is the case with NATO’s air defence of the 
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Baltic States and was the case with the West’s disapproving response to Russian protests 
against the removal of the war statue in Tallinn in April 2007. But at the same time, the 
West should continue guarding its own values and interests, regardless of whether they 
are rejected by the Kremlin. Since the problems between Russia and the West at the 
higher political-strategic level are likely to continue, emphasis should be placed on 
cooperation at the lower, ‘grassroots’, level in particular, eg by military (cadets) and 
civilian (students) representatives of the younger generation. In such a way, by fostering 
confidence and security between the young on both sides, the relationship between the 
West and Russia can be improved from the bottom up. Moreover, as regards cooperation 
at all levels between Russia and the West,this should concentrate on mutually beneficial, 
non-politically sensitive and practical projects. 
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